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ABSTRACT
The strong correlation between parents' economic status and that of their children has been well-
documented, but little is known about the extent to which this is a causal phenomenon. This paper
attempts to improve our understanding of the causal processes that contribute to intergenerational
immobility by exploiting historical changes in compulsory schooling laws that affected the
educational attainment of parents without affecting their innate abilities or endowments. We
examine the influence of parental compulsory schooling on grade retention status for children aged
7 to 15 using the 1960, 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses. Our estimates indicate that a one-year
increase in the education of either parent reduces the probability that a child repeats a grade by
between two and seven percentage points. Among 15 to 16 year olds living at home, we also
estimate that parental compulsory schooling significantly lowers the likelihood of dropping out.
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 I. Introduction 
 
 
A high degree of persistence in economic status exists across generations, but we know 
very little about the causal processes that drive this phenomenon.  For example, children who 
grow up in more highly educated families have better labor market outcomes as adults than 
children who grow up in less educated families, but we do not know whether this is because 
education bestows parents with skills that make them better parents or because genetic or 
environmental factors that contributed to the parents’ educational levels are shared by their 
children.  This paper attempts to improve our understanding of the causal processes that 
contribute to intergenerational immobility by exploiting historical changes in compulsory 
schooling laws that affected the educational attainment of parents without affecting their innate 
abilities.  Quantifying the extent to which children’s well-being can be improved by increasing 
their parents’ education also has important implications for public policy: most discussions about 
the government’s role in providing educational aid, for example, focus on the individual’s return 
to education and ignore the possibility of social benefits.  Knowing that there are 
intergenerational returns to increased schooling would provide a further rationale for such 
programs. 
Few studies have attempted to isolate the causal effect of education on the next 
generation’s well-being.  This is at least partly due to the fact that it is difficult to find plausible 
sources of identifying variation.  It is also hard to find large, nationally representative datasets 
that simultaneously provide information on parental characteristics and children’s outcomes.       
Our use of compulsory schooling laws applied to Census data allow us to overcome both of these 
problems.  Several studies have already demonstrated a strong relationship between these laws  2
and individuals’ educational attainment.  Angrist and Krueger (1991) provided the initial 
intuition behind this natural experiment when they used quarter of birth to identify the wage 
return to education on the grounds that those who were born in later quarters of the year were 
compelled to get more education because compulsory education laws forced students to stay in 
school until they reached a certain age.
1  More recent studies examine how changes in the school 
leaving laws and child labor laws themselves correlate with school attainment across region and 
over time.  Lleras-Muney (2001) and Goldin and Katz (2003) show that these laws were 
effective at raising education levels in the United States.  Harmon and Walker (2000) and 
Oreopoulos (2003) find similar effects on education attainment from changes in compulsory 
schooling in the United Kingdom and Canada. Lleras-Muney also investigates the origins of 
these laws in the United States and concludes that the law changes were not driven by underlying 
trends in educational attainment but by exogenous political factors.  Previous studies have used 
these laws to examine the effects of education on earnings [Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999], 
criminal activity [Lochner and Moretti, 2001], mortality [Lleras-Muney, 2002], and subjective 
measures of well-being [Oreopoulos, 2003], but this is the first study to estimate the 
intergenerational effects of the U.S. laws.   
Our main analysis is based on a sample of children ages 7-15 taken from the 1960, 1970 
and 1980 individual U.S. Census files.  We examine the effects of parental education on 
children’s grade retention, and find a substantial and significant positive effect of parental 
education on children’s human capital accumulation.  This effect is somewhat larger than OLS 
estimates would suggest.  The estimates indicate that a one-year increase in the education of 
                                                 
1 Subsequent studies question whether the quarter-of-birth variable is a valid instrument in these analyses. 
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and Bound and Jaeger (1997) for example, show that education 
attainment and quarter of birth are only weakly correlated, and that weakly correlated instruments can 
generate estimates that are biased in the same direction as OLS.  Compulsory schooling laws are much 
more strongly correlated with educational attainment than individuals’ quarters of birth, however.  3
either parent reduces the probability that a child repeats a grade by between two to seven 
percentage points, and indicate that parental education has an independent and significant effect 
on children’s education outcomes.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes related studies 
that attempt to understand the relationship between parents’ education and children’s outcomes.  
Sections III and IV outline our empirical strategy and data, respectively.  We present our results 
in Section V and draw conclusions from them in Section VI. 
 
II. Background Literature 
    A few previous studies have attempted to isolate the causal influence of parental 
education by comparing siblings.  Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) for example, use within twin 
variation in education to identify the effects of twin mother’s schooling on the educational 
attainment of their offspring.  An advantage of this approach is that it controls for all unobserved 
mother characteristics that are common to twins.  A disadvantage of this approach, however, is 
that it may exacerbate biases if within twin pair differences in characteristics give rise to the 
differences in their education levels and also affect their children’s outcomes.
2 Within twin 
estimates are also known to be more prone to measurement error problems (Griliches, 1979).  
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) compare test scores of siblings whose mothers increased their 
schooling in between births and find evidence that additional maternal education improves 
students’ test scores.  Using a similar strategy, Currie and Moretti (2002) find that higher 
maternal education improves infant health.  This estimation strategy provides the opportunity to 
control for mother fixed effects, yet, it is not clear whether the observed improvements in 
                                                 
2  Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1994), for example, find birth weight differences between twins correlate 
significantly with schooling differences and subsequent earnings.  Recent work by Antonovics and Goldberg (2003) 
questions the robustness of the Behrman and Rosenzweig’s (2002) results.    4
children’s test scores are driven by changes in mother’s schooling or whether they are driven by 
other changes in the mother’s circumstances over time that might be correlated with schooling.  
Sacerdote (2000) compares socioeconomic outcomes of adoptees that were randomly assigned to 
their adoptive parents and finds no evidence that the adoptive parents’ education affects their 
children’s outcomes.
3  This approach is appealing because it is impossible to ascribe the 
intergenerational link to a genetic inheritance, but it does not entirely eliminate the possibility of 
selection bias since even with random assignment parents have the ability to turn a child down. 
In addition, an observed correlation could be driven by parental characteristics that are not 
genetically transmitted to children but that nevertheless affect both individual and offspring’s 
human capital accumulation.
4 
Most existing studies have also relied on small, nonrepresentative, datasets.  The 
Behrman and Rosenzweig study, for example, uses samples of 212 female twin pairs and 122 
male twin pairs who participated in the Minnesota Twin Registry.  Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1994) use a sample of unusually young mothers from the NLSY.  Likewise, Sacerdote’s 
analyses focus on fewer than 200 adoptees per sample who were born in Britain (the first 
sample) or adopted in Colorado (the second sample).  
Our approach is similar in spirit to another estimation strategy undertaken by Currie and 
Moretti (2002), which isolates the effect of mothers’ education on birth outcomes (birthweight 
and gestational age) using county level data on college openings between 1940 and 1990 to 
capture differences in the availability of educational services among different cohorts of women 
giving birth in the same county and year.   These differences are then used to identify differences 
                                                 
3 He does find evidence that parents’ education matters among adopted children in the NLSY, but these children 
were not necessarily randomly assigned to their adoptive parents. 
4 For example, if characteristics that lead to higher education levels also contribute to better parenting skills 
independent of the level of education, then researchers’ inability to control for these characteristics will result in 
upward biased estimates of education effects.  5
in mothers’ education levels.  The authors estimate that an additional year of maternal education 
reduces the incidence of low birth weight by approximately ten percent, and the incidence of pre-
term birth by approximately six percent.   
Like Currie and Moretti, we also use geographic/cohort/year variation to identify the 
effect of parental education.  Another similarity between our study and theirs is that both employ 
large datasets, although Currie and Moretti’s data are only from California. One concern with 
Currie and Moretti’s identification strategy is that differences in the density of post secondary 
institutions may reflect differences in demand for college, which may in turn be correlated with 
parental characteristics that determine children’s outcomes. For example, college openings may 
happen as a response to increases in the number of qualified students who live in the area, and 
changes in the degree of college preparedness may affect future generations’ well-being whether 
or not the parent actually goes to college.   
It is worthwhile to highlight some key differences between our study and theirs.  First, we 
use a different source of identifying variation.  We will argue that changes in compulsory 
schooling laws are unlikely to be correlated with individual characteristics other than schooling.  
In addition, the law changes that we use to identify the effects of parental education will affect a 
different part of the education distribution relative to the instruments used by Currie and Moretti: 
changes in compulsory schooling laws will affect parents with low levels of education, whereas 
changes in the number of post secondary institutions will affect those with higher levels of 
education. One might expect that an additional year of schooling would have more impact 
among those with relatively little education.  Another difference is that we focus on children’s 
human capital accumulation instead of health outcomes.  Finally, our study allows us to examine  6
the effects of both mothers’ and fathers’ education levels, whereas Currie and Moretti’s data only 
contain information on mothers’ education level.   
  Recent papers by Chevalier (2003) and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2003) also use 
changes in compulsory schooling laws to identify the effect of parental education on the next 
generation’s outcomes.  Chevalier’s study uses a change in the compulsory schooling 
requirement that took place in Britain in 1957.  He finds large effects of mother’s education on 
children’s educational attainment, but does not find statistically significant effects of father’s 
education.    The single change in the minimum schooling law, however, prevents the use of 
cohort-specific trends.  As a result, it is impossible to disentangle compulsory schooling effects 
from cohort effects.  Chevalier’s sample of children is also confined to those who are still living 
at home with their parents, and the distribution of educational attainment among children living 
at home will be different from that in the population.  Teenagers who are high school dropouts, 
for example, are more likely to be living apart from their parents than those who are still in 
school.  While a high proportion of 16 and 17 year-olds still live at home, among those that left 
school early, that proportion is much lower. 
  Black, Devereux and Salvanes examine the effects of an increase in mandatory schooling 
from 7 to 9 years, which was phased in across municipalities in Norway between 1959 and 1973.  
Using the timing of the law changes to instrument for parental education, they find weak (but not 
statistically significant) evidence of a causal relationship between parental education and 
children’s outcomes.  They do find however, that among mothers with low levels of education, 
the mandated increase in education had a statistically significant effect on their children’s 
educational attainment.      7
  The larger variation in compulsory school law changes in the United States, and the 
larger samples from the U.S. Censuses enable us to arrive at much more precise estimates than 
from the Norwegian analysis.  Institutional differences across countries may also lead to different 
results.  Cross-country comparisons of intergenerational mobility find that Americans exhibit 
less mobility than most Europeans [Bjorklund et al.(2002); Solon (1999)].  Finally, the Black et 
al. estimates may be downward biased because all of the children in the sample are subject to the 
9 year schooling requirement, whereas only some of the parents are affected by the change in the 
law.  We are able to avoid this because we focus on children’s grade retention instead of 
completed education.  
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
 Let  if y denote a relevant outcome for child i living in family f. Suppose that the true 
model for  if y is 
 
(1)  if f f f if X MothEd FathEd y ε β β β α + + + + = 3 2 1  
 
where  f FathEd and  f MothEd indicate the educational attainment of the child’s father and 
mother,  f X is a vector of all the other family background characteristics that affect the child’s 
outcome, and  if ε is an error term representing the effects of individual specific factors that are 
uncorrelated with family background.  If we could observe everything that belongs in X then 
estimates of  1 β  and  2 β  would capture the effects of parents’ educational attainment that are 
independent of their other characteristics.   Because this is not possible, we attempt to address the  8
omitted variables problem by using U.S. compulsory school laws as instruments for completed 
education.  Lleras-Muney (2001), Schmidt (1995) and Goldin and Katz (2003) have documented 
the effectiveness of these laws from 1910 to 1940, specifically examining the effects of the latest 
age allowed before requiring school entry, the minimum school leaving age, and the minimum 
age at which a child could obtain a work permit to exempt her from school.  All three studies 
conclude that these laws had modest, but statistically significant effects on educational 
attainment.  For example, Goldin and Katz (2003) conclude that changes in compulsory school 
legislation over this 30-year period account for about 5 percent of the more than doubling of 
secondary school enrollment.   
  Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) have also collected and recorded information on 
compulsory schooling laws between 1915 and 1969, and have used them to estimate both 
individual and social returns to education.  They simplify the laws by converting them into two 
variables: the minimum length of time required in school before being allowed to leave, and the 
minimum length of time required in school before being allowed to obtain a work permit.  While 
both types of laws were influential, work exemptions often allowed students to leave school 
before the minimum school leaving age.  Several authors have found that the effect of work 
permits on educational attainment often dominated the effect of school leaving age restrictions.  
Therefore, our instruments will be based on the minimum number of years of schooling required 
in order to obtain a work permit and we will use Acemoglu and Angrist’s data collection and 
simplification.
5  Estimates based on school leaving age restrictions are very similar.
6  In the 
following section, we describe more precisely how we utilize their information on the laws. 
                                                 
5 The variables collected by Acemoglu and Angrist, Goldin and Katz, and Lleras-Muney are very similar and yield 
similar IV estimates.  We chose to work with Acemoglu and Angrist’s laws because they allowed us to examine 
parents from a wider range of birth cohorts. 
6 Available from the authors.  9
  We estimate the effect of parents’ education simultaneously, as in equation (1), and 
separately.  Since the standard error estimates that are produced when we estimate equation (1) 
are too large to be able to discern which parent’s education affects the child more, our discussion 
will focus on separate analyses of mothers’ and fathers’ education, recognizing that the estimated 
coefficient we obtain for each parent’s education will also reflect any benefits to the child that 
result if more highly educated parents are able to obtain “better” spouses.  The results that are 
produced from our joint estimation of mothers’ and fathers’ education are discussed in Section 
V.F.  
Instead of estimating the equations at the individual level, we conduct our instrumental 
variables analysis after aggregating our data to the parental state of birth, parental cohort, and 
census year level.  Aggregating to the state of birth and cohort level explicitly acknowledges that 
our identifying variation comes from variation in compulsory schooling laws across states and 
cohorts rather than across individuals.  We also aggregate separately by census year because we 
wish to take into account the fact that our data are derived from three different census years by 
including census year fixed effects.   There are two reasons that we wish to do this.  First, each 
cohort is observed three times: in 1960, 1970 and 1980, and as each cohort ages, their average 
level of completed education may change.  Second, there may be minor differences across survey 
instruments.
7   
 To estimate the instrumental variables counterpart of equation (1), we first generate cell 
means for all variables in the regression specification.  We then estimate the following first-stage 
regression equations:   
                                                 
7 We have also run individual level regressions, regressions that are based on aggregation to the parental state and 
year of birth only, and regressions in which the cells are defined by parental state of birth/parental year of 
birth/census year and child’s state of residence.  The latter specification allows us to include state fixed effects, 
which control for differences in educational quality experienced by children across states.  These specifications all 
produce very similar estimates.  10
(2)    jk k j y yjk k j k j k j yjk u u u u X CL CL CL FathEd + + + + + + + + = + + + 4 14 , 3 14 , 2 14 , 1 0 9 8 7 γ γ γ γ γ  
(3)  lm m l y ylm k j k j k j ylm v v v v X CL CL CL MothEd + + + + + + + + = + + + 4 14 , 3 14 , 2 14 , 1 0 9 8 7 η η η η η ,  
where  yjk FathEd  represents average father’s education level for the group of youths observed in 
census year y, with fathers from state  j  born in year k ,  ylm MothEd  represents average mother’s 
education level for the group of youths who are observed in census year y, with mothers from 
state  l born in year m , and  X  is a vector of variables that capture the child group’s average  
race, gender and age.  We will estimate both the first and second stage standard errors using 
Huber-White standard error estimates and clustering by parent’s state and year of birth.  The 
instruments to be excluded are CL7, CL8, and CL9 which are dummy variables that denote 
required years of schooling prior to obtaining a work permit of 7, 8, or 9 or more years.  Details 
of how these variables are coded are given in the data section.  Fixed effects are included for the 
relevant census year, and parent’s state and year of birth. 
Identifying the effects of the compulsory school laws on parental education is made 
possible through differences in the timing of the changes in these laws across states.   
Importantly, there is no reason to expect a future generation’s human capital to affect the laws 
that were imposed on a prior generation. It is also difficult to think of parental characteristics that 
would be affected by compulsory schooling laws except through the laws’ effect on parental 
education.  If compulsory schooling laws were changed in response to other changes in a state 
such as its demand for low-skilled workers, then they would make poor instruments for 
estimating contemporaneous wage returns to education, but changes in state characteristics are 
unlikely to have an effect on children’s grade retention some twenty years later.   
 Lleras-Muney (2001) devotes considerable attention to this issue and finds no evidence 
that the law changes reflect other factors that might affect parent’s education levels. For  11
example, she includes measures of manufacturing wages, the percent of workers employed in 
manufacturing, expenditures on education and a number of demographic characteristics in 
regressions of educational attainment on compulsory schooling laws and finds that their 
inclusion does not affect the coefficient estimates on the laws.  She also matches individuals to 
the laws that were in place when they turned 15  through 24 years of age (when the laws should 
no longer have had an effect), and finds that while current laws are always significant, future 
laws are virtually never significant.
8   
A related concern is that changes in compulsory schooling laws affect the educational 
attainment of the adults in the child’s state.  This might lead to changes in the child’s 
environment beyond her own family background that could affect her eventual outcomes.  For 
example, if more highly educated adults are more likely to support school taxes, and higher 
school expenditures affect children’s human capital then compulsory schooling laws will not 
allow us to isolate the effect of growing up in a more educated family from the effect of growing 
up in a more educated community.  Fortunately, several findings in the literature suggest that any 
“spillover” effects of the laws will be small.  Goldin and Katz (2003), for example, find that 
compulsory schooling laws only explain about 5% of the convergence in educational attainment 
between 1915 and 1940.  In addition, the laws have been shown to have no impact on 
educational attainment beyond 12
th grade.  This, combined with the fact that those affected by a 
change in the law will comprise only a small fraction of the total stock of adults, suggests that 
changes in compulsory schooling will have minimal affects on the education level of the adults 
in the child’s community.  Furthermore, Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) find little evidence that 
education generates positive externalities (in the form of higher wages).   
                                                 
8 Landes and Solomon (1972) run similar but much sparser regressions for the period 1880-1910 (which is prior to 
the period we study) using only 10 year leads and find that the laws passed 10 years later were correlated with 
educational attainment.  12
Nevertheless, we take the possibility of instrument endogeniety seriously and employ a 
number of strategies to verify that our compulsory schooling variables are not picking up the 
effect of other changes in the child’s environment. For example, we show that the effect of the 
laws is experienced exclusively by parents with less than 12 years of education, which reduces 
the likelihood that they reflect more general state or cohort effects.  We also show that our 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of many state/year controls and to the exclusion of children 
who reside in the same state in which their parents were born.  The details of these analyses are 
discussed in Sections V.D and V.E. 
   The following shows our main second-stage regression equations: 
(4)  yjk k j y yjk yjk yjk X FathEd y ε ε ε ε δ δ δ + + + + + + = 2 1 0  
(5)  ylm m l y ylm ylm ylm e e e e X MothEd y + + + + + + = 2 1 0 λ λ λ  
where  yjk y  is the average child outcome among children in census year  y , with fathers from 
state  j  born in year k , and  ylm y  is defined similarly for mothers.   
 
IV. Data 
IV.A. Census Data 
Our analysis uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) created 
by the Census Bureau.  The IPUMS consists of individual and household level data from the 
decennial census, and includes nearly all of the detail originally recorded by the census 
enumerations.  Information exists at the individual level on a broad range of individual 
characteristics, including fertility, marital status, immigration, labor-force participation, income, 
occupational structure, education, ethnicity and household composition.  We use the 1% samples 
from the 1960, 1970 and 1980 Censuses, which creates for us a dataset of 711,072 children  13
living in two parent families and 129,632 children living in single parent families.  The size of 
our dataset is an enormous advantage in terms of enabling us to obtain precise estimates.  Most 
previous studies of intergenerational education effects have been hampered by researchers’ 
reliance on datasets of fewer than 1,000 observations. The main disadvantage of the IPUMS, and 
the reason that it has not been used for intergenerational mobility studies, is that it is a cross-
sectional dataset that contains little information on children’s outcomes.   Typical measures of 
children’s success, such as test scores or behavioral problems are not collected by the census.  
Measures of longer term outcomes such as wages, labor force participation or teenage 
childbearing are available in IPUMS, but since many of these attributes are relevant only for 
individuals who are in their late teens or older, analyses of these outcomes becomes complicated 
by the fact that older children are more likely to live apart from their family of origin.  If an 
individual is living outside of his parents’ household then there is no way to link him up with his 
relevant family background characteristics. 
The IPUMS does contain information on the level of educational attainment obtained by 
each member of the household.  We use this information, together with information on the 
child’s age to determine whether or not she repeated a grade.  Grade repetition is both a 
widespread phenomenon in the United States and is correlated with many, more commonly used, 
measures of eventual educational achievement.  A recent report from the National Longitudinal 
Study of Adolescent Health, for example, indicates that over 20% of American adolescents have 
repeated a grade (Resnick, et.al. 1997), and Feldman (1997) estimates that in many urban 
districts more than half of all students will be retained.  The likelihood of being held back is also 
highly correlated with family background: in 1995, the probability of being retained was about 
40% higher among young adults from low income families relative to young adults from middle  14
income families, and about 50% higher for blacks compared to whites (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 1997).   
There is also evidence that grade retention is correlated with other measures of children’s 
success.  The National Center for Education Statistics (1997) for example, estimates that 
approximately one quarter of young adults who had repeated a grade had dropped out of school 
by 1995.  Similarly, Smith and Shepard (1989) find that students who have previously repeated a 
grade tend to have worse academic outcomes than similar students who have not repeated a 
grade.  Since educational attainment and test scores are well known to be predictors of adult 
earnings and health, these studies suggest that if we can obtain estimates of the causal effect of 
family income and parental education on the probability that a child repeats a grade, we will also 
gain insight into the causal relationship between these family background characteristics and 
children’s long-run success. 
  Determining whether or not a child has repeated a grade is complicated by the fact that 
there is variation across states and over time in the minimum age at school entry, incomplete 
information on school entry cut-off dates across states and over time, and questions about the 
degree to which school districts comply with those dates.
9 Since we do not have school entry 
cutoff dates for each state and year, we create two different measures for assessing “normal” 
educational progress.  Our first measure assumes that all states use October 1 as their cut-off 
date.  In other words, we assume that a child who turns six in the first three quarters of the 
calendar year will enter first grade in the fall of that year, and that a child you turns six in the 
fourth quarter of the year will enter first grade in the fall of the following year.  Our limited 
                                                 
9 We have been able to obtain state level information on minimum school entry ages and cut-off dates for 1955 
and 1965: 43 states in 1955 and 32 states in 1965.  Twenty two states maintained the same cutoff dates over the ten 
year period and 7 states changed their cutoff-date.  Missing information prevents us from determining what 
happened in the remaining states. 
  15
information on school entry cutoff dates in 1955 and 1965 indicates that he vast majority of 
states invoked cutoff dates between September 1 and November 1.  The Census provides 
information on age at the time of the survey, quarter of birth and enumeration date.  From this 
data it is straightforward to determine the year and quarter in which a child was born.  We assign 
a value of 1 to the variable REPEAT if the child’s reported years of completed schooling is less 
than the number of years he “should” have completed based on the Oct 1 cutoff date and 0 if the 
child is on target or ahead. 
  Our second measure classifies children whose educational attainment is below the 
median for their state, age, quarter of birth, and census year cell as repeaters.  In other words, we 
estimate the number of years a child “should” have completed based on the median grade 
reached among those who are the same age, and were born in the same birthquarter, live in the 
same state, and were observed in the same census year. Any child below the median is then 
classified as having repeated a grade.  Thus, our second dependent variable, <MEDIAN-GRD, is 
equal to 1 if a child’s grade is below the median for other corresponding children, and 0 
otherwise.  We think that <MEDIAN-GRD is a cleaner measure of whether or not a child has 
repeated a grade because it takes into account state and individual level characteristics that affect 
the age at which the child was likely to have enrolled in school.  Because individuals’ completed 
education levels are heavily clustered at the median, about 10-15% of children in each cell are 
below the median.  These percentages are similar to the percent of those who are classified as 
having repeated using the REPEAT measure. 
  Neither of these measures is perfect.  Students who entered school late, for example, will 
be classified as having been held back, and delayed entry into kindergarten is a fairly common 
practice.  Nine percent of first and second graders in the mid-1990’s had entered kindergarten  16
late, whereas only 5-6% had repeated kindergarten (National Center for Education Statistics, 
2000).  In a recent paper, Cascio (2003) compares directly reported measures of grade repetition  
in the 1992, 1995 and 1999 Current Population Survey School Enrollment Supplement to a 
below grade proxy created using educational attainment data available in the Census. She finds 
that about 20% of all children are incorrectly classified by the below grade proxy, and that about 
94% of such errors are comprised of children who have not repeated a grade but who are 
classified as such by the proxy.   
  Normally, researchers are not concerned that noisy dependent variables will generate 
biased estimates because measurement error in a normally distributed dependent variable merely 
generates inefficient standard error estimates.  Cascio points out, however, that when the 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the individual has repeated a grade, then 
consistency may be a problem.  Measurement error in a binary dependent variable will produce 
attenuated parameter estimates (Aigner, 1973; Hausman, 2001).  Cascio estimates that the 
attenuation factor that results from using dependent variables like our REPEAT and <MEDIAN-
GRD may be as high as 0.35.  While we would prefer to generate unbiased estimates, downward 
biased estimates will still be informative because our prior is that the intergenerational 
correlation captures effects that are not wholly causal.  Therefore, estimates that are statistically 
different from zero will still allow us to reject the hypothesis that there is not an exogenous effect 
of parental education on children’s human capital.    Also, although <MEDIAN-GRD is binary, 
it is a less noisy variable than REPEAT because it takes into account variation in state, age and 
quarter of birth by normalizing attainment within each cell.  Specifications based on this 
measure, therefore, should suffer less from attenuation bias than those based on REPEAT.  17
The analysis focuses on children between the ages of 7 and 15 years of age.  Children 
younger than age 7 are not included because they are not old enough to have had the opportunity 
to repeat a grade.  We exclude children older than age 15 in order to avoid over-representing 
children that left home at late ages.  To adjust for the fact that older sample members have had 
more of an opportunity to repeat a grade, and to adjust for possible gender differences in grade 
repetition, all of our regressions include controls for age and gender.  Summary statistics for our 
samples are shown in Appendix Table 1. 
 
IV.B. Compulsory Schooling Laws 
  Our compulsory schooling data have been previously collected by Acemoglu and 
Angrist, and by Lleras-Muney.  Lleras-Muney’s collection of compulsory schooling data is 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~alleras/papers.htm. The Acemoglu and Angrist data we 
utilize are summarized in more detail in their appendix.  As noted above, we follow earlier 
authors by using a variable designed to capture the minimum number of years of schooling that 
would be required before an individual is eligible for a work permit.  Specifically, we use the 
following variable to instrument for education: 
CL=max{required years of schooling before receiving a work permit; minimum age required for 
a work permit-enrollment age} 
In order to capture a potentially non-linear relationship between years of schooling 
required and educational attainment, we use the CL variable to create dummy variables of the 
form: 
CL6 =1 for CL ≤ 6, and 0 otherwise 
CL7 =1 for CL = 7, and 0 otherwise  18
CL8 =1 for CL = 8, and 0 otherwise 
CL9 =1 for CL ≥  9, and 0 otherwise 
These dummies are matched to parents in our sample based on the school entry laws that 
were in place in their state of birth when they were 6 years old and the school leaving laws that 
were in place when they were 14 years old.  We chose these as the relevant matching years  
because they are the lowest common entry and leaving ages across states.  Although we would 
prefer to match according to the parents’ state of residence at ages 6 and 14, that information is 
not available in the Census, which is our primary source of data.  This inevitably leads to some 
mismatches, but the resulting errors are unlikely to be correlated with the laws because the laws 
were not likely a motivating factor behind cross-state moves.  Over 90% of parents in our sample 
faced 6 to 9 years of mandatory compulsory schooling. 
 
V. Results 
V.A. First-stage Results 
  Before turning to our 2SLS estimates, we examine the results produced by the first stage.  
Table 1 shows that compulsory schooling laws changed frequently both across states and within 
states over time.
10  For example, in 1940 there were 7 states that required seven or fewer years of 
schooling, four states that required exactly eight years of schooling and 26 states that required 
nine years.  Moreover, between 1915 and 1970, required years increased to more than seven in 
29 states while 24 states increased the required number of years to more than 10.  About 1/3 of 
the variation in the laws is across-states and about 2/3 is within states over time.   
                                                 
10 The table includes the number of states that are included in our sample for each year.  We are missing compulsory 
schooling data for Alaska and Hawaii.  The table omits additional states in a few years because our sample of 
children does not always include a match with a particular parental state/year cell.  19
  Table 2 provides the coefficient estimates from the estimation of equations 2 and 3, along 
with the partial R
2 and the F-statistic for the hypothesis that the compulsory schooling laws are 
jointly equal to zero.  Looking first at the relationship between the laws and married fathers’ 
educational attainment, we see that the coefficient estimates on the compulsory schooling 
dummies increase monotonically as expected and are all statistically significant.  Importantly, 
given our goal of using this relationship as the basis for instrumental variables estimation, the F-
statistic for the full sample of married fathers on the joint test of instrument significance is 46.  
Bound, Baker and Jaeger (1995) have suggested that one should be concerned about the 
possibility of weak instrument bias when F statistics are close to 1.  Staiger and Stock (1997) 
further suggest that a value of less than 5 could signal weak instruments. Our F-statistic suggests 
that the instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor, which gives us some 
confidence that our IV estimates are unlikely to suffer from bias due to weak instruments.  The 
partial R
2 on the instruments is 0.004.  This is an order of magnitude greater than the first-stage 
partial R
2 which generated concern by Bound Baker and Jaeger. 
  For more evidence that the compulsory schooling laws are affecting parental education in 
the expected way, we separate the sample on the basis of the parents’ completed education level.  
Since compulsory schooling laws never mandate high school completion, we do not expect the 
law changes to have an affect on educational attainment beyond high school.  The relationship 
that we see for the full sample in Table 2 should break down when looking at only those with 
more than a high school education.  For the subsample of children whose fathers’ highest level of 
education was a high school diploma or less, all of the relevant statistics look much the same as 
in column 1.  Among children whose parents received some post-secondary schooling, however, 
the compulsory schooling dummies show no evidence of being correlated with higher levels of  20
educational attainment.  The partial R
2 on the instruments is smaller than for less educated 
parents, and the F-statistic has a value of 4. This suggests that compulsory schooling laws are not 
picking up more general state-level changes in educational attainment.
11 
  The first-stage estimates for mothers in two parent families and heads in single parent 
families look very similar to those for fathers.  For both types of parents, the point estimates on 
the compulsory schooling dummies suggest that more required years of schooling is positively 
correlated with higher educational attainment.  This pattern is repeated among less educated 
parents, but does not hold among more highly educated parents.  In addition, the partial R
2 range 
from .007 to .011 for both the full samples and the samples of less educated parents, but are 
much smaller for the samples of highly educated parents.  Likewise, the F-statistic is large for the 
combined sample and for the less educated sample, but falls to 2 when the sample is confined to 
parents with some post-secondary education.  Taken together, these first-stage estimates suggest 
that compulsory schooling laws are strongly correlated with the levels of educational attainment 
that one would expect.  
 
V.B. Reduced Form Results  
  Table 3 provides the reduced form results from regressing children’s educational progress 
on the compulsory schooling dummies.    The first-stage effects of the minimum school leaving 
age faced by the parents are strong enough to observe a substantive reduced form effect on 
children’s grade repetition.  Children whose fathers were required to stay in school for 7 years 
                                                 
11 We leave out those children whose parents have exactly 12 years of education because it is unclear how we would 
expect the education levels of these parents to have been affected by the change in the laws.  On the one hand, since 
the laws do not ever mandate that an individual complete high school, we would expect the laws to have minimal 
explanatory power among parents with 12 or more years of schooling.  On the other hand, individuals obliged to 
continue high school may perceive the costs of graduation to be smaller than if they could have left school earlier, 
and may, therefore, decide to stay on until they obtain a degree.  When we conduct our analyses by education 
category but include the parents with exactly 12 years of schooling our results are similar to those we present here.  21
were 1.5 percentage points less likely to repeat a grade, on average, than those whose parents 
faced more lenient schooling requirements.  The pattern of the estimates is also in keeping with 
what one would expect: children whose parents were required to stay in school more years 
generally experienced larger human capital gains.  This pattern is similar when we use the work 
permit laws faced by married mothers and single parents. 
 
V.C. OLS Results 
  The next table displays estimates produced by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions 
of equation (1).  Across all parental types and education categories, parental education is strongly 
significantly related to children’s human capital accumulation.  In general, the point estimates 
suggest that an additional year of education will reduce the probability that a child repeats a 
grade by 3 to 4 percentage points. The marginal effect of education is smaller among more 
highly educated parents, suggesting that the intergenerational return to education falls as 
education increases, but the estimates are still substantive and statistically significant.    These 
results are consistent with the existing literature, which has documented a positive 
intergenerational correlation between parents’ education and that of their offspring.  What is 
unclear is the extent to which these estimates reflect a causal relationship.  To what degree can 
parents improve their children’s progress through school by investing in their own human 
capital?  This question is addressed by our IV estimates in the following section. 
 
V.D.  Two-stage Least Squares Results   
The estimates presented in Table 5 are generated when compulsory schooling laws are 
used as instruments for parental education.   Regardless of which definition of educational  22
progress is used, the IV estimates indicate that an increase in parental education will lower the 
probability that a child is held back in school.  The point estimates suggest that raising mother or 
father’s education by one year (about a third of a standard deviation) will reduce the probability 
of their children being retained by between 3 and 8 percentage points.  The estimates are all 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
Like previous work that uses compulsory schooling laws as instruments, the IV estimates 
are larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
12  Some researchers have argued that this 
phenomenon occurs because errors-in-variables biases outweigh omitted variables biases in OLS 
regressions.  Another explanation is that compulsory schooling laws affect schooling levels at the 
bottom of the education distribution but not at the top.  The marginal effect of an additional year 
of schooling is likely to be larger among those with low skill levels, and Angrist, Imbens and 
Rubin (1996) note that IV estimates will reflect the marginal return for the group that is affected 
by the instrument.  The pattern of the OLS estimates across education groups is consistent with 
this possibility, with the estimated correlations between parental education and children’s 
outcomes being two to four times greater among children with less educated parents than among 
children whose parents have more than twelve years of education.
13   
  The next panel of Table 5 shows the results from IV regressions applied to the subset of 
children whose parents have less than 12 years of education.  The evidence presented above on 
the power of the first-stage regressions suggests that the IV strategy is most appropriate for this 
restricted sample, since our instrument has very low power among parents with more than 12 
years of education.  As expected, these estimates are similar to the estimates generated by the full 
                                                 
12 The confidence intervals around the OLS estimates do not include the IV estimates, and vs. versa.  Hausman tests 
for equality of the OLS and IV estimates also reject the null of equality, but this test may not be appropriate since we 
are using clustered data.  
13 Of course, if there are omitted variables then the information provided by OLS estimates must be regarded with 
caution.  23
sample, although they are no longer statistically significant for children growing up in single-
parent families when using the <MEDIAN-GRD measure. 
The last column of Table 5 presents the results from IV regressions that use the log of 
parental wages as the dependent variable.
14  We present these estimates in order to show that 
they are very similar to those produced by Acemoglu and Angrist (1999), who use the same 
instruments to estimate wage returns to education.  For example, we find that the wage return to 
an additional year of father’s education is about 12%, which compares favorably to Acemoglu 
and Angrist’s estimate of 8%.  The estimated returns for married women and single parents are 
somewhat higher.  Acemoglu and Angrist confine their analysis to men.
15 
While not directly comparable because of differences in the dependent variables, our 
estimates appear to be slightly smaller and more precisely estimated than those produced by 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes, who find that an additional year of parental education will raise 
the child’s education by .04 to .11 of a year but whose estimates are not generally statistically 
different from zero.  If we assume that grade-repetition will translate less than one-for-one into 
differences in completed schooling, our point estimates imply substantially smaller effects. As 
noted above, the fact that our estimated effects are statistically significant (despite their smaller 
magnitudes), may reflect the greater amount of variation in compulsory schooling laws in our 
sample, relative to the Black, el al. sample.  Another difference between our study and theirs is 
                                                 
14 We eliminate parents with zero wages or income. 
15 We also measured educational progression as the relative difference between a child’s actual grade and the 
median grade of that child’s age, quarter of birth, stage, and census year group.  In these regressions, which are not 
shown, the estimated coefficients suggest that increasing father’s education by one year will increase his child’s 
years of schooling-for-age by 0.02 of a year and that increasing mother’s education by one year will raise her child’s 
years of schooling-for-age by 0.01.  These coefficients are much less precisely estimated than when we use 
REPEAT and <MEDIAN-GRD, however, probably because variation in the residual reflects variation at both the 
upper and lower tails of the distribution of education.  Forcing parents to complete another year of high school may 
have an affect on the probability that the child repeats a grade, but no effect on the probability that the child 
completes a grade ahead of schedule.  The estimated effect of father’s education is statistically different from zero at 
the 1% level, but the estimated effect of mother’s education is not statistically significant at any usual confidence 
level.    24
that Black et. al.  also consistently report IV estimates that are below their OLS estimates.  Two 
possible explanations are that 1) measurement error in the Norwegian education data is likely 
very small because the data come from an administrative source, and 2) returns to education do 
not differ greatly across segments of the Norwegian population 
Since grade repetition and educational-attainment-for-age are not typical dependent 
variables, we have also used our instruments to estimate the effect of parental education on the 
probability that a child drops out of school.  Using census data on 15-18 year olds living at home, 
we construct a variable that is equal to one if the child is not currently enrolled in school and has 
not completed 12 or more years of schooling, and we create the same measure for a sub-sample 
of 15-16 year olds.    Because the census files only allow us to look at outcomes for children 
while they are in the same household as a parent, the high school drop-out variable is not ideal:  
dropping out of school is likely to be correlated with moving out of a parents’ household.  As a 
result, the analysis will suffer from selection bias.  Despite this concern, we present some results 
using dropout status as our dependent variable, with the caveat that the effects shown here cannot 
be generalized to the entire population of 15-18 year olds.  Selection issues may be less severe 
for the sample of 15-16 year olds.
 16 
The results from this exercise are presented in Table 6.  Across all samples, and 
regardless of the measure of parental education used, there is a negative and (with one exception) 
statistically significant relationship between parents’ education and the probability of dropping 
out of high school.  As with our analysis of grade repetition, the IV estimates are larger in 
absolute value than the OLS estimates, and suggest a significant causal relationship running from 
parental education to children’s educational attainment.  Among 15-18 year olds, these estimates 
                                                 
16 Roughly 95% of 15 year olds in the Census live with at least one parent, but only 77% of 15 year-old high school 
dropouts live with a parent.  At age 17, these fractions fall to 88% of all 17 year olds, and 67% of 17 year old 
dropouts.  25
suggest that an additional year of parental education reduces the probability of dropping out by 3 
to 5 percentage points.  The mean drop-out rate for this sample is .07 among two parent 
households, and .13 among single parent households.  There is also evidence that sample 
selection affects the estimates.  The coefficient estimates fall (in absolute value) substantially 
when we limit the sample to 15 and 16 year olds, who are more likely to be observed living with 
a parent.  This might be expected if children not living with their parents are also less influenced 
by parental characteristics and resources.    
Finally, the magnitudes of the effects on drop-out rates are sensible given our estimates 
on grade repetition.  As noted above, the National Center for Educational Statistics reports that 
roughly a quarter of those repeating grades eventually dropped out of high school. Our results for 
15 and 16 year olds suggest effects on the drop-out rate that are roughly one-quarter the size of 
the effects on grade retention.  The estimated effects on the drop-out rate are large, relative to the 
sample mean drop-out rates.  It seems likely, however, that typical drop-out rates among children 
whose parents were affected by compulsory schooling laws may be substantially higher.  The 
average drop-out rate among children of fathers with less than a high school education, for 
example, is .12, compared with .07 for the full sample.  While we do not wish to draw any strong 
conclusions from the drop-out analysis given the sample selection issues involved, the results in 
Table 6 are consistent with those produced by our main analysis.  Higher parental education 
appears to result in improved educational outcomes for children. 
 
V.E.  Further Investigation of Instrument Exogeneity  
   An important set of concerns with our identification strategy is that the instruments  
may be correlated with other state-level changes that affect children’s progress through school.   26
It is important to remember that since the relevant compulsory schooling laws pertain to the year 
that the parent turned 14, such state-level changes would have to have an effect on children’s 
outcomes approximately twenty years later.   We have also demonstrated that compulsory 
schooling laws only affect educational attainment among parents with low skills, which suggests 
that they are not picking up a more general state trend.  Nevertheless, in this section we devote 
our attention to a number of additional robustness checks.  
First, we add a variety of state-year controls to our regressions.  The additional variables 
are motivated by Lleras-Muney (2001) who explicitly explores the possibility that compulsory 
schooling laws are endogenous with respect to educational attainment, and include the state 
population, the number of schools per square mile, the number of doctors per capita, the value 
per acre of farm land, the percent of the state population that is foreign born, the fraction of the 
state population living in urban areas, the fraction who are manufacturing workers, and average 
wages per worker.  The results from this exercise are displayed in the Table 7.  Inclusion of the 
state/year controls has virtually no effect on the estimated effect of parental education and the 
First-stage F-statistics remain strong.
17  In the next column we include regional trends along with 
the additional control variables.  The inclusion of the regional trends has virtually no impact on 
the estimated effect of father’s education, but it does reduce the estimated coefficient on 
mother’s education when the dependent variable is <MEDIAN-GRD, and it is no longer 
statistically different from zero.   
We have also estimated our regressions with state-specific trends, but we find that this 
greatly reduces the first-stage power of our excluded instruments. It is thus not possible to 
separately identify the effects of the state-specific timing of compulsory schooling law changes 
                                                 
17 The estimated coefficients in the single-parent sample are hardly affected by the inclusion of state controls, but the 
estimated standard error increases so that the statistical significance of the estimates is  reduced.  27
from the effects of other, unobserved state-specific trends.  Perhaps this should not be surprising 
given that over the period we study most states experienced both upward trends in educational 
attainment and increases in compulsory schooling requirements.  We note, however, that in order 
for our IV estimates to be biased unobserved state trends would have to be correlated with 
educational outcomes for children that are observed many years later, and often in different 
states (35% of our children do not reside in their parent’s state of birth).  We also note that the 
estimated coefficients produced by IV regressions that include state trends are very similar to 
those that were previously reported, but that their accompanying standard error estimates are 
much larger.   
Another way of exploring the possibility that our results are driven by unobserved state 
trends is to replicate our analysis using only the subset of states and periods for which there was 
a decrease in the minimum required years of schooling.  We, therefore, create a subsample that 
includes all state/year cells from five years prior to a decline in the minimum schooling 
requirement through the five years following the law change.
18  Like the rest of the country these 
states experienced a positive trend in average educational attainment in spite of the fact that their 
compulsory schooling requirements were falling, but because their compulsory schooling laws 
are moving in the opposite direction, the IV estimates for this sample are less likely to be driven 
by underlying trends that affect educational attainment.  Table 8 shows that restricting the 
sample in this way has virtually no effect on the estimates, although the estimates for children in 
single-parent families are no longer statistically significant in the <MEDIAN-GRD specification.      
  Next, we compare estimates across samples that include different subsets of years during 
which the parent turned age 14.  If the law changes affect only particular periods, then some 
                                                 
18 If a state experienced an increase in required years of schooling during the five year period after the initial law 
change then it is dropped from the sample. If a second decline in required years occurred during the five year period 
then the state is included in the sample.   28
other period-specific event may be behind the identifying variation.  For brevity, we focus only 
on the estimates for <MEDIAN-GRD.  The results presented in Table 9 look remarkably similar 
across the different cohorts, with estimates of the effect of each parent’s education level ranging 
between 4 and 7%.   Furthermore, there is no apparent trend in the magnitude of the estimates 
over time. 
Finally, we estimate the effect of parental education on children’s human capital using a 
sample that excludes children who are living in the same state in which their parents were born.  
What is nice about this sample of “movers” is that even if unobserved factors in the parent’s state 
of birth influenced the parent’s education decision they will not be related to the current 
educational environment in the child’s state.  The results from this exercise are shown in the first 
column of each panel in Table 10 and are very similar to those for the full sample.  We can also 
restrict our identifying variation even further by including interactions between the parent’s age 
and current state of residence.
19  This leaves us with only cross-sectional variation in compulsory 
schooling laws and removes any remaining possibility that the estimated effects of parental 
education reflect unobserved within parental-state-of-birth changes over time.  By comparing the 
estimates produced by this very restrictive specification to those in columns 1 and 3, we can 
compare estimates using purely cross-sectional variation to those combining cross-sectional and 
time-series variation.  A finding that these two different sources of identification produce similar 
results should help to alleviate concerns about instrument exogeneity. 
    In fact, although this restriction reduces the estimates substantially, they are still 
statistically different from zero, and suggest that a one year increase in parental education will 
reduce the probability of repeating a grade by approximately two percentage points.  The smaller 
estimates may indicate that some of our identification is, indeed, coming off of state trends and 
                                                 
19 In order to include state of residence dummies, we run these regressions at the individual level.  29
that the “true” effect of parental education is somewhat lower than the previous tables suggest.   
Nevertheless, it is striking that we continue to find a positive and statistically significant effect 
whether our identification is confined to cross-sectional or time-series variation. 
 
V.F. Simultaneous Estimation of Mothers’ and Fathers’ Education Effects 
  Our analyses so far have focused on the relationship between one parent’s education and 
her child’s human capital, but an advantage of our data is that we have information on each 
parent’s educational attainment.  In principle, therefore, we can test the hypothesis that mothers’ 
education is more influential than fathers’ and vs. versa.  Previous authors have speculated that 
because mothers and fathers tend to form different types of relationships with their children, the 
effect of their relative education levels may also be quite different.  Behrman and Rosenzweig, 
for example, find no evidence that the level of mother’s education has a positive effect on her 
child’s outcome but do find evidence that more highly educated fathers tend to raise more highly 
educated children.  One explanation for their finding is that more highly educated women are 
less likely to stay home, which may have a detrimental affect on their children’s development.  
Although the estimates presented in the previous tables are based on regressions that include 
only one parent’s level of education, they represent the combined effect of each parent’s 
education together with any effect that results from assortative mating.  In order to determine the 
relative importance of each parent’s education level one must include them in the same 
regression. 
   Table 11 shows how the estimates of parental education are affected when mother’s and 
father’s education are included in the same equation.  We find that the combined estimates on 
each parent’s education are about the same as when they are estimated separately and that the  30
estimates are always jointly significant.   The standard error estimates are much higher, however, 
and the estimates are not individually significantly different from zero or from each other.  This 
is not surprising since our identification strategy rests on variation across states and over time, 
and mothers and fathers are often close in age and from the same state.  Unfortunately, the 
imprecision of the estimates means that it is impossible to say anything about each parent’s 
relative importance in the transmission process.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
  This paper  provides new evidence on the causal effect of parental education across 
generations.  The limited literature on the intergenerational effects of parental education has 
struggled to find appropriate identification strategies; we draw on variation in compulsory 
schooling laws, which are arguably exogenous with respect to children’s outcomes fifteen or 
more years later.  Using data from the 1960-1980 Census files, we estimate that an increase in 
parental education of one year will reduce a child’s probability of being retained by between 2 
and 7 percentage points.  Since grade retention is negatively correlated with other academic 
outcomes, the positive effect of parental education on children’s grade progression is likely to 
have long-term socio-economic benefits as well. 
  Identification of a causal effect of parental education implies that at least some of the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality can be attributed to environmental influences.  There 
are many ways in which higher levels of parental education might affect a child’s environment, 
including increases in family income, better parenting, and improved social networks.   
Understanding the mechanism by which parental education increases children’s human capital is 
an important question that deserves further research.  Nevertheless, our results are encouraging,  31
as they suggest that government intervention may be able to play a role in altering 
intergenerational immobility.  Specifically, knowing that there are intergenerational returns to 
increased schooling provides a further rationale for programs that provide educational assistance.   
  More generally, our results draw attention to the social externalities that are associated 
with education.  While much research has been devoted to understanding the private returns to 
education via individual wage effects, designing effective education policy hinges crucially on 
taking the full social costs and benefits into account.  There is increasing evidence that the social 
returns to education are substantial
20 and our estimates suggest yet another dimension along 
which positive externalities occur.  Taken together, these findings indicate that the total returns 
to education may be seriously underrepresented by estimates that focus only on individual wage 
effects.  
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   < 7 years < 8 years < 9 years
Total States 
observed
1915 32 46 47 47
1920 30 47 47 47
1925 15 33 48 49
1930 14 29 48 49
1935 9 21 48 49
1940 7 21 47 49
1945 7 21 47 49
1950 5 15 34 49
1955 3 15 32 49
1960 4 12 31 49
1965 3 11 29 49
1970 3 9 23 41
Table 1
State Mandatory Schooling Laws by Year
Number of States with Mandatory Years of:Years of schooling required 
before work permit all <12th Grade >12th Grade all <12th Grade >12th Grade all <12th Grade >12th Grade
7 years 0.205 0.204 0.045 0.206 0.202 0.033 0.282 0.123 0.185
(0.043) (0.039) (0.030) (0.040) (0.042) (0.029) (0.080) (0.075) (0.074)
  8 years 0.312 0.280 -0.025 0.298 0.303 -0.006 0.464 0.348 0.029
(0.038) (0.038) (0.027) (0.035) (0.038) (0.026) (0.072) (0.067) (0.064)
  9 years 0.524 0.496 0.017 0.510 0.439 0.031 0.733 0.547 0.085
(0.050) (0.051) (0.036) (0.044) (0.046) (0.033) (0.085) (0.085) (0.081)
     
Initial Sample Size 711,072 711,072 711,072 711,072 711,072 711,072 129,771 129,771 129,771
Cell Mean Sample Size
Adj. R2 0.890 0.809 0.454 0.845 0.753 0.472 0.688 0.552 0.248
Adj. R2 without instruments 0.886 0.802 0.45 0.837 0.742 0.472 0.681 0.544 0.247
F-Test: Instruments = 0 46.4 34.4 3.9 59 36.9 1.5 32.2 19.6 2.2
Fathers Mothers Heads
Table 2
First Stage: Effects of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Parents' Education
Dual Parent Families Single Parent Families
Dependent Variable: Parents' Highest Grade of Schooling:
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls include race, gender age, and asian ethnicity.
Data are grouped into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown
from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. The ommited compulsory school law variable indicates whether the minimum years of schooling required before
able to obtain a work permit was 6 or less. Samples include all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born parents aged 14 between 1915 and 1969. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.   See text for more data specifics.Years of schooling required  <MEDIAN <MEDIAN <MEDIAN
before work permit REPEAT GRD REPEAT GRD REPEAT GRD
7 years -0.015 -0.012 -0.016 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
  8 years -0.022 -0.018 -0.021 -0.014 -0.021 -0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
  9 years -0.040 -0.031 -0.039 -0.025 -0.033 -0.020
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Dependent Variable:
Table 3
Reduced Form Effects of Parents' Compulsory Schooling Laws on Children's Educational Attainment
Education Attainment of:
Fathers Mothers Single Parents
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls include race,
gender age, and asian ethnicity. Data are grouped into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by
cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. The ommited
compulsory school law variable indicates whether the minimum years of schooling required before able to obtain a work permit was
6 or less. Samples include all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born parents aged 14 between 1915 and 1969. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics.<MEDIAN
Dependent Var: Repeat GRD
   
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.030 -0.029
(0.001) (0.001)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.036 -0.036
(0.001) (0.001)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.029 -0.026
(0.002) (0.002)
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.038 -0.037
(0.002) (0.002)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.040 -0.041
(0.002) (0.002)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.027 -0.024
(0.002) (0.002)
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.009 -0.011
(0.002) (0.002)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.006 -0.009
(0.002) (0.003)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.011 -0.008
(0.003) (0.003)
Parent's Education > 12 years
Table 4
OLS Estimates of Effect of Parent's Education on Children's Education
Full Sample
Parent's Education < 12 yearsDependent Variable: <MEDIAN Parent's Log
Repeat GRD Annual Earnings
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.076 -0.059 0.115
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.075 -0.049 0.205
(0.006) (0.006) (0.038)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.048 -0.027 0.202
(0.009) (0.009) (0.039)
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.082 -0.073
(0.011) (0.011)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.081 -0.062
(0.012) (0.013)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.043 -0.021
(0.016) (0.016)
Table 5
IV Effects of Parental Education on Children's Education and Parent's  Earnings
Parent's Education < 12 years
Full Sample
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census
year. Additional controls include race, gender age, and asian ethnicity. Data are grouped
into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by cell
population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by birth cohort and
state of birth. Samples include all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born parents aged 14
between 1915 and 1969. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See text for more data
specifics.Mean Number of
Dropouts OLS IV Cells
Dual Parent: Father's Education 0.07 -0.017 -0.034 5,047
(0.001) (0.005)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education 0.07 -0.022 -0.048 5,047
(0.001) (0.006)
Single Parent: Household Head 0.134 -0.020 -0.030 5,047
(0.001) (0.008)
Dual Parent: Father's Education 0.045 -0.012 -0.022 4,887
(0.001) (0.005)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education 0.045 -0.016 -0.035 4,887
(0.001) (0.007)
Single Parent: Household Head 0.082 -0.013 -0.018 3,817
(0.002) (0.010)




Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls
include race, gender age, and asian ethnicity. Data are grouped into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and
census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by birth
cohort and state of birth. Samples include all children aged 15 to 18 or 15 to 16 residing with a parent that was aged 14
between 1915 and 1969.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics. 
Father's Education Mother's Education Single Parent's Education
Outcome Variable
Repeat -0.082 -0.087 -0.085 -0.081 -0.079 -0.068 -0.048 -0.053 -0.039
(0.011) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.031)
<MEDIAN GRD -0.073 -0.061 -0.064 -0.062 -0.041 -0.022 -0.027 -0.023 -0.020
(0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.017) (0.032)
Census Parent's St Cntrls no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Parent's Regional Trends no no yes no no yes no no yes
Years of schooling required before work permit
7 years 0.205 0.106 0.098 0.206 0.096 0.051 0.282 0.087 0.088
(0.043) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) (0.080) (0.069) (0.070)
8 years 0.312 0.114 0.100 0.298 0.118 0.066 0.464 0.133 0.113
. 0382 (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.029) (0.030) (0.072) (0.061) (0.062)
9 or more years 0.524 0.293 0.191 0.510 0.309 0.174 0.733 0.368 0.232
(0.050) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.038) (0.039) (0.085) (0.073) (0.075)
F-statistic (instruments) 46.4 17   6.9 59 30.1 10.3 23 12.5 3.8
First Stage
Table 7
Sensitivity of IV Estimates to Additional Controls
IV Coefficients
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls include race, gender age, and asian
ethnicity. Census Parent's State Controls include fraction in state black, in the labor force, in the manufacturing sector, residing on a farm, and average age.
Data are grouped into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are
shown from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. Samples include all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born parents aged 14 between 1915 and 1969.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics.<MEDIAN
Dependent Variable: Repeat GRD Cell-size
   
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.032 -0.032 1009
(0.002) (0.002)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.040 -0.040 1009
(0.003) (0.003)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.027 -0.022 929
(0.004) (0.004)
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.060 -0.069 1009
(0.017) (0.019)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.070 -0.067 1009
(0.013) (0.015)




OLS and IV Estimates for States with a Downward Change in Mandatory School Years
Table 8
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year.
Additional controls include race, gender age, and asian ethnicity. Data are grouped into means by
parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-
White standard errors are shown from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. Standard errors
are in parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics. 
Full
Sample 1915 - 44 1920 - 49 1925 - 54 1930 - 59 1935 - 64 1940 - 69
Father's -0.0573 -0.0362 -0.0744 -0.0625 -0.0555 -0.0482 -0.0572
  Education (0.006) (0.019) (0.021) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
Mother's -0.0491 -0.0681 -0.0556 -0.0516 -0.049 -0.0389 -0.0359
  Education (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
Single Parent's -0.0273 -0.0475 -0.0439 -0.0369 -0.0354 -0.0206 -0.0028
  Education (0.009) (0.045) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.026)
number of states                          
that changed laws
(out of 49) 48 44 44 34 36 33 34
Year when Parent Aged 14
Table 9
IV Effects of Parent's Education on Child's Education for Different Cohorts of Parents
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year. Additional controls
include race, gender age, and asian ethnicity. Data are grouped into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and
census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by birth
cohort and state of birth. The full sample includes all children aged 7 to 15 with U.S. born parents aged 14 between
1915 and 1969.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics.Dependent Variable:
   
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.022 -0.022 -0.024 -0.024
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.025
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.071 -0.024 -0.073 -0.026
(0.012) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.064 -0.022 -0.064 -0.029
(0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Single Parent: Household Head -0.041 -0.020 -0.041 -0.027
(0.017) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
Parent's Birthplace Dummies Yes No Yes No
State of Residence*Parent's No Yes No Yes




IV Estimates for Sample of Children in States Different from parent's State of Birth
REPEAT <MEDIAN-GRD
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year.
Additional controls include race, gender age, and asian ethnicity. Data are grouped into means by
parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted by cell population size. Huber-White
standard errors are shown from clustering by birth cohort and state of birth. Standard errors are in
parenthesis.  See text for more data specifics.<MEDIAN
Dependent Variable: Repeat GRD Cell-size
   
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.010 -0.011 1009
(0.000) (0.000)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.018 -0.019 1009
(0.000) (0.000)
Dual Parent: Father's Education -0.040 -0.089 1009
(0.037) (0.046)
Dual Parent: Mother's Education -0.032 0.045 1009
(0.042) (0.053)
F-test: Father and Mother's 124.9 45.3
Education Effect = 0
Table 11
Estimated Simultaneous Effects of Parental Education 
OLS
IV
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for parent's birth year, state of birth, and
census year. Additional controls include race, gender age, and asian ethnicity. Data are
grouped into means by parent's birth year, state of birth, and census year, and weighted
by cell population size. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by birth
cohort and state of birth. Standard errors are in parenthesis. See text for more data
specifics.1960 1970 1980 Combined 1960 1970 1980 Combined
Age 40.85 40.43 39.49 40.29 38.84 38.22 36.26 37.49
(7.26) (7.13) (7.09) (7.18) (7.93) (7.68) (7.20) (7.61)
Highest Grade 10.29 11.47 12.60 11.41 9.36 10.43 11.56 10.70
(3.64) (3.39) (3.27) (3.56) (3.35) (3.06) (2.66) (3.08)
Age 37.51 37.44 36.78 37.27
(6.53) (6.57) (6.32) (6.49)
Highest Grade 10.56 11.38 12.17 11.35
(2.88) (2.50) (2.41) (2.68)
Age 10.70 10.94 11.08 10.90 11.05 11.08 11.14 11.10
(2.52) (2.55) (2.57) (2.55) (2.56) (2.57) (2.58) (2.57)
Highest Grade 4.22 4.43 4.55 4.40 4.43 4.52 4.55 4.51
(2.57) (2.62) (2.64) (2.61) (2.63) (2.65) (2.62) (2.63)
Black 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.35                                
Female 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50
                           
REPEAT 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.22
<MEDIAN GRD 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.25
Observations 233,080 266,265 211,727 711,072 26,939 45,462 57,231 129,771
Children
Dual Parent Families Single Parent Families
Appendix Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Father or Household Head among Single Parent Families
Mother